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We consider a data analyst’s problem of purchasing data from strategic agents to compute an unbiased estimate
of a statistic of interest. Agents incur private costs to reveal their data and the costs can be arbitrarily correlated
with their data. Once revealed, data are verifiable. This paper focuses on linear unbiased estimators. We design
an individually rational and incentive compatible mechanism that optimizes the worst-case mean-squared
error of the estimation, where the worst-case is over the unknown correlation between costs and data, subject
to a budget constraint in expectation. We characterize the form of the optimal mechanism in closed-form. We
further extend our results to acquiring data for estimating a parameter in regression analysis, where private
costs can correlate with the values of the dependent variable but not with the values of the independent
variables.
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1 INTRODUCTION
In the age of automation, data is king. The statistics and machine learning algorithms that help
curate our online content, diagnose our diseases, and drive our cars, among other things, are all
fueled by data. Typically, this data is mined by happenstance: as we click around on the internet,
seek medical treatment, or drive “smart” vehicles, we leave a trail of data. This data is recorded
and used to make estimates and train machine learning algorithms. So long as representative
data is readily abundant, this approach may be sufficient. But some data is sensitive and therefore
inaccurate, rare, or lacking detail in observable data traces. In such cases, it is more expedient to
buy the necessary data directly from the population.
Consider, for example, the problem a public health administration faces in trying to learn the
average weight of a population, perhaps as an input to estimating the risk of heart disease. Weight
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is a sensitive personal characteristic, and people may be loath to disclose it. It is also variable
over time, and so must be collected close to the time of the average weight estimate in order to
be accurate. Thus, while other characteristics, like height, age, and gender, are fairly accurately
recorded in, for example, driver’s license databases, weight is not. The public health administration
may try surveying the public to get estimates of the average weight, but these surveys are likely to
have low response rates and be biased towards healthier low-weight samples.
In this paper, we propose a mechanism for buying verifiable data from a population in order to
estimate a statistic of interest, such as the expected value of some function of the underlying data.
We assume each individual has a private cost, or disutility, for revealing his or her sensitive data to
the analyst. Importantly, this cost may be correlated with the private data. For example, overweight
or underweight individuals to have a higher cost of revealing their data than people of a healthy
weight. Individuals wish to maximize their expected utility, which is the expected payment they
receive for their data minus their expected cost. The analyst has a fixed budget for buying data.
The analyst does not know the distribution of the data: properties of the distribution is what she is
trying to learn from the data samples, therefore it is important that she uses the data she collects to
learn it rather than using an inaccurate prior distribution (for example, the analyst may have a
prior on weight distribution within a population from DMV records or previous surveys, but such
a prior may be erroneous if people do not accurately report their weights). However, we do assume
the analyst has a prior for the marginal distribution of costs, and that she estimates how much a
survey may cost her as a function of said prior.1
The analyst would like to buy data subject to her budget, then use that data to obtain an unbiased
estimator for the statistic of interest. To this end, the analyst posts a menu of probability-price pairs.
Each individual i with cost c selects a pair (A, P) from the menu, at which point the analyst buys
the data with probability A at price P . The expected utility of the individual is thus (P − c)A.2 To
form an estimate based on this collected data, we assume the analyst uses inverse propensity scoring,
pioneered by Horvitz and Thompson [13]. This is the unique unbiased linear estimator; it works by
upweighting the data from individual i by the inverse of his/her selection probability, 1/A.
The Horvitz-Thompson estimator always generates an unbiased estimate of the statistic being
measured, regardless of the price menu. However, the precision of the estimator, as measured by
the variance or mean-squared error of the estimate, depends on the menu of probability-price pairs
offered to each individual. For example, offering a high price would generate data samples with low
bias (since many individuals would accept such an offer), but the budget would limit the number
of samples. Offering low prices allows the mechanism to collect more samples, but these would
be more heavily biased, requiring more aggressive correction which introduces additional noise.
The goal of the analyst is to strike a balance between these forces and post a menu that minimizes
the variance of her estimate in the worst-case over all possible joint distributions of the data and
cost consistent with the cost prior. We note that this problem setting was first studied by Roth and
Schonebeck [21], who characterized an approximately optimal mechanism for moment estimation.
1.1 Summary of results and techniques
Our main contribution comes in the form of an exact solution for the optimal menu, as discussed
in Section 3. As one would expect, if the budget is large, the optimal menu offers to buy, with
probability 1, all data at a cost equal to the maximum cost in the population. If the budget is
1This prior could come from similar past exercises. Alternatively, when no prior is known, the analyst can allocate a fraction
of his budget to buying data for the sake of learning this distribution of costs. In this paper, we follow prior work (e.g.,
Roth and Schoenebeck [21]) and assume that a prior distribution is known, instead of focusing on how one might learn the
distribution of costs.
2As we show, this menu-based formulation is fully general and captures arbitrary data-collection mechanisms.
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small, the optimal menu buys data from an individual with probability inversely proportional to
the square root of their cost.3 Interestingly, in intermediate regimes, we show the optimal menu
employs pooling: for all individuals with sufficiently low private cost, it buys their data with
equal probability; for the remaining high cost agents, it buys their data with probability inversely
proportional to the square root of their costs. Revisiting the example of estimating the weight of a
population of size n, our scheme suggests the following solution. Imagine the costs are 0, 4, 8 with
probability 12 ,
1
4 ,
1
4 , and the total budget of the analyst is B = 7n. The analyst brings a scale to a public
location and posts the following menu of pairs of allocation probability and price: {(1, 365 ), ( 45 , 8)}. A
simple calculation shows that individuals with cost 0 or 4 will pick the first menu option: stepping
on the scale and having their weight recorded with probability 1, and receiving a payment of 365
dollars. Individuals with cost 8 will pick the second menu option; if they are selected to step on
the scale, which happens with probability 45 , the analyst records their weight scaled by a factor of
5
4 . This scaling is precisely the upweighting from inverse propensity scoring. In expectation over
the population, the analyst spends exactly his budget 7n. The estimate is the average of the scaled
weights.
We show how to extend our approach in multiple directions. First, our characterization of the
optimal mechanism holds even when the quantity to be estimated is the expected value of a d-
dimensional moment function of the data. Second, we extend our techniques beyond moment
estimation to the common task of multi-dimensional linear regression. In this regression problem, an
individual’s data includes both features (which are assumed to be insensitive or publicly available)
and outcomes (which may be sensitive). The analyst’s goal is to estimate the linear regression
coefficients that relate the outcomes to the features. We make the assumption that an individual’s
cost is independent of her features, but may be arbitrarily correlated with her outcome. For example,
the goal might be to regress a health outcome (such as severity of a disease) on demographic
information. In this case, we might imagine that an agent incurs no cost for reporting his age,
height or gender, but his cost might be highly correlated with his realized health outcome. In such
a setting, we show that the asymptotically optimal allocation rule, given a fixed average budget
per agent as the number of agent grows large, can be calculated efficiently and exhibits a pooling
region as before. However, unlike for moment estimation, agents with intermediate costs can also
be pooled together. We further show that our results extend to non-linear regression in the full
version of the paper, under mild additional conditions on the regression function.
Our techniques rely on i) reducing the mechanism design problem to an optimization problem
through the classical notion of virtual costs, then ii) reducing the problem of optimizing the worst-
case variance to that of finding an equilibrium of a zero-sum game between the analyst and an
adversary. The adversary’s goal is to pick a distribution of data, conditional on agents’ costs, that
maximizes the variance of the analyst’s estimator. We then characterize such an equilibrium through
the optimality conditions for convex optimization described in [2].
1.2 Related work
A growing amount of attention has been placed on understanding interactions between the strategic
nature of data holders and the statistical inference and learning tasks that use data collected from
these holders. The work on this topic can be roughly divided into two categories according to
whether money is used for incentive alignment.
3Of course, the individual is him/herself selecting the menu option and so the use of an active verb in this context is perhaps
a bit misleading. What we mean here is that, given his/her incentives based on his/her private cost, the choice the individual
selects is one that buys his/her data with probability inversely proportional to the square root of his/her cost.
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In the first category, individuals as data holders do not directly derive utility from the accuracy of
the inference or learning outcome, but in some cases may incur a privacy cost if the outcome leaks
their private information. The analyst uses monetary payments to incentivize agents to reveal their
data. Our work falls into this category. Prior papers by Roth and Schoenebeck [21] and Abernethy
et al. [1] are closest to our setting. Similarly to our work, both Roth and Schoenebeck [21] and
Abernethy et al. [1] consider an analyst’s problem of purchasing data from individuals with private
costs subject to a budget constraint, allow the cost to be correlated with the value of data, and
assume that individuals cannot fabricate their data. Roth and Schoenebeck [21] aim at obtaining
an optimal unbiased estimator with minimum worst-case variance for population mean, while
their mechanism achieves optimality only approximately: instead of the actual worst-case variance,
a bound on the worst-case variance is minimized. While our setting is identical to that of [21],
our work precisely minimizes worst-case variance (under a regularity assumption on the cost
distribution), and our main contribution is to exhibit the structure of the optimal mechanism, as
well as to extend our results to broader classes of statistical inference, moment estimation and
linear regression. In particular, compared to [21], our solution exhibits new structure in the form
of a pooling region for low cost agents; i.e., the optimal mechanism pools agents with the lowest
costs together and treats them identically. Such structure does not arise in [21] under a regularity
assumption on the cost distribution. Abernethy at al. [1] consider general supervised learning.
They do not seek to achieve a notion of optimality; instead, they take a learning-theoretic approach
and design mechanisms to obtain learning guarantees (risk bounds).
Several papers consider data acquisition models with different objectives under the assumptions
that (a) individuals do not fabricate their data, and (b) private costs and value of data are uncorrelated.
For example, in the work of Cummings et al. [6], the analyst can decide the level of accuracy for
data purchased from each individual, and wishes to guarantee a certain desired level of accuracy of
the aggregated information while minimizing the total privacy cost incurred by the agents. Cai et
al. [3] focus on incentivizing individuals to exert effort to obtain high-quality data for the purpose
of linear regression. Another line of research in the first category examines the data acquisition
problem under the lens of differential privacy [5, 9–11, 18]. The mechanism designer then uses
payments to balance the trade-off between privacy and accuracy.
In the second category, individuals’ utilities directly depend on the inference or learning outcome
(e.g. they want a regression line to be as close to their own data point as possible) and hence
they have incentives to manipulate their reported data to influence the outcome. There often is
no cost for reporting one’s data. The data analyst, without using monetary payments, attempts
to design or identify inference or learning processes so that they are robust to potential data
manipulations. Most papers in this category assume that independent variables (feature vectors) are
unmanipulable public information and dependent variables are manipulable private information [7,
14, 15, 19], though some papers consider strategic manipulation of feature vectors [8, 12]. Such
strategic data manipulations have been studied for estimation [4], classification [12, 14, 15], online
classification [8], regression [7, 20], and clustering [19].Work in this category is closer to mechanism
design without money in the sense that they focus on incentive alignment in acquiring data (e.g.,
strategy-proof algorithms) but often do not evaluate the performance of the inference or learning,
with a few notable exceptions [8, 12].
2 MODEL AND PRELIMINARIES
Survey Mechanisms. There is a population of n agents. Each agent i has a private pair (zi , ci ),
where zi ∈ Z is a data point and ci > 0 is a cost. We think of ci as the disutility agent i incurs by
releasing her data zi . The pair is drawn from a distributionD, unknown to the mechanism designer.
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We denote with F the CDF of the marginal distribution of costs,4 supported on a set C. We assume
that F and the support of the data points,Z, are known. However, the joint distribution D of data
and costs is unknown.
A survey mechanism is defined by an allocation ruleA : C → [0, 1] and a payment rule P : C → R,
and works as follows. Each agent i arrives at the mechanism in sequence and reports a cost cˆi . The
mechanism chooses to buy the agent’s data with probability A(cˆi ). If the mechanism buys the data,
then it learns the value of zi (i.e., agents cannot misreport their data) and pays the agent P(cˆi ).
Otherwise the data point is not learned and no payment is made.
We assume agents have quasi-linear utilities, so that the utility enjoyed by agent i when reporting
cˆi is
u(cˆi ; ci ) = (P(cˆi ) − ci ) · A(cˆi ) (1)
We will restrict attention to survey mechanisms that are truthful and individually rational.
Definition 1 (Truthful and Individually Rational - TIR). A survey mechanism is truthful if
for any cost c it is in the agent’s best interest to report their true cost, i.e. for any report cˆ :
u(c; c) ≥ u(cˆ; c) (2)
It is individually rational if, e. for any cost c ∈ C, P(c) ≥ c .
We assume that the mechanism is constrained in the amount of payment it can make to the
agents. We will formally define this as an expected budget constraint for the survey mechanism.
Definition 2 (Expected Budget Constraint). A mechanism respects a budget constraint B if:
n · Ec∼F [P(c) · A(c)] ≤ B (3)
Estimators. The designer (or data analyst) wishes to use the survey mechanism to estimate some
parameter θ ∈ R of the marginal distribution of data points.5 For example, it might be thatZ = R
and θ is the mean of the distribution over data points in the population. To this end, the designer
will apply an estimator to the collection of data points S elicited by the survey mechanism. We
will write θˆS for the estimator used. Note that the value of the estimator θˆS depends on the sample
S , but might also depend on the distribution of costs F and the survey mechanism. Due to the
randomness inherent in the survey mechanism (both in the choice of data points sampled and the
values of those samples), we think of θˆS as a random variable, drawn from a distribution T(D,A).
We will focus exclusively on unbiased estimators.
Definition 3 (Unbiased Estimator). Given an allocation function A, an estimator θˆS for θ is
unbiased if for any instantiation of the true distribution D its expected value is equal to θ :
EθˆS∼T(D,A)
[
θˆS
]
= θ . (4)
Given a fixed choice of estimator, the mechanism designer wants to construct the survey mech-
anism to minimize the variance (finite sample or asymptotic as the population grows) of that
estimator. Since the designer does not know the distribution D, we will work with the worst-case
variance over all instantiations of D that are consistent with the cost marginal F .
Definition 4 (Worst-Case Variance). Given an allocation function A and an instance of the
true distribution D, the variance of an estimator θˆS is defined as:
V(θˆS ;D,A) = EθˆS∼T(D,A)
[(
θˆS − E
[
θˆS
] )2]
(5)
4Throughout the text we will use the CDF to refer to the distribution itself.
5We also extend our results to multi-dimensional parameters; see Section 4.
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The worst-case variance of θˆS is
V∗(θˆS ;F ,A) = sup
D consistent with F
V(θˆS ;D,A). (6)
We are now ready to formally define the mechanism design problem faced by the data analyst.
Definition 5 (Analyst’s Mechanism Design Problem). Given an estimator θˆS and cost dis-
tribution F , the goal of the designer is to design an allocation rule A and payment rule P so as to
minimize worst-case variance subject to the truthfulness, individual rationality and budget constraints:
inf
A,P
V∗(θˆS ;F ,A)
s.t. n · Ec∼F [P(c) · A(c)] ≤ B
A, P define a TIR mechanism
(7)
Implementing Surveys as Posted Menus. The formulation above describes surveys as direct-
revelation mechanisms, where agents report costs. We note that an equivalent indirect implemen-
tation might be more natural: a posted menu survey offers each agent a menu of (price, probability)
pairs (p1,A1), . . . , (pk ,Ak ). If the agent chooses (pm ,Am) then their data is elicited with probability
Am , in which case they are paid pm . Each agent can choose the item that maximizes their expected
utility, i.e., argmaxm∈[k ] (pm −c) ·Am . By the well-known taxation principle, any survey mechanism
can be implemented as a posted menu survey, and the number of menu items required is at most
the size of the support of the cost distribution.
2.1 Reducing Mechanism Design to Optimization
We begin by reducing the mechanism design problem to a simpler full-information optimization
problem where the designer knows the private cost of each player and can acquire their data by
paying them exactly that cost. However, the designer is constrained to using monotone allocation
rules, in which players with higher costs have weakly lower probability of being chosen.
Definition 6 (Analyst’s Optimization Problem). Given an estimator θˆS and cost distribution
F , the optimization version of the designer’s problem is to find a non-increasing allocation rule A that
minimizes worst-case variance subject to the budget constraint, assuming agents are paid their cost:
inf
A
V∗(θˆS ;F ,A)
s.t. n · Ec∼F [c · A(c)] ≤ B
A is monotone non-increasing
(8)
The mechanism design problem in Definition 5 reduces to the optimization problem given by
Definition 6, albeit with a transformation of costs to virtual cost.
Definition 7 (Virtual Costs and Regular Distributions). If F is continuous and admits
a density f then define the virtual cost function as ϕ(c) = c + F(c)f (c) . If F is discrete with support
C = {c1, . . . , c |C |} and PDF f , then define the virtual cost function as: ϕ(ct ) = ct + ct−ct−1f (ct ) F (ct−1),
with c0 = 0. We also denote with ϕ(F ) the distribution of virtual costs; i.e., the distribution created
by first drawing c from F and then mapping it to ϕ(c). A distribution F is regular if the virtual cost
function is increasing.
When F is twice-continuously differentiable, F is regular if and only if F (c)f ′(c) < 2f (c)2 for
all c ∈ C. Importantly, in this case, the allocation rule of Roth and Schoenebeck [21] is monotone
strictly decreasing in c and does not exhibit a pooling region at low-cost as our solution does.
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The following is an analogue of Myerson’s [16] reduction of mechanism design to virtual welfare
maximization, adapted to the survey design setting.
Lemma 2.1. If the distribution of costs F is regular, then solving the Analyst’s Mechanism Design
Problem reduces to solving the Analyst’s Optimization Problem for distribution of costs ϕ(F ).
Proof. The proof is given in the full version of the paper. 
2.2 Unbiased Estimation and Inverse Propensity Scoring
We now describe a class of estimators θˆS that we will focus on for the remainder of the paper. Note
that simply calculating the quantity of interest, θ , on the sampled data points can lead to bias, due
to the potential correlation between costs and data. For instance, suppose that z ∈ R and the goal
is to estimate the mean of the distribution of z. A natural estimator is the average of the collected
data: θˆS = 1|S |
∑
i ∈S zi . However, if players with lower z tend to have lower cost, and are therefore
selected with higher probability by the analyst, then this estimator will consistently underestimate
the true mean.
This problem can be addressed using inverse propensity scoring (IPS), pioneered by Horvitz and
Thompson [13]. The idea is to recover unbiasedness by weighting each data point by the inverse
of the probability of observing it. This IPS approach can be applied to any parameter estimation
problem where the parameter of interest is the expected value of an arbitrary moment function
m : Z → R.
Definition 8 (Horvitz-Thompson Estimator). The Horvitz-Thompson estimator for the case
when the parameter of interest is the expected value of a (moment) functionm : Z → R is defined as:
θˆS =
1
n
∑
i ∈[n]
m(zi ) · 1{i ∈ S}
A(ci ) (9)
The Horvitz-Thompson estimator is the unique unbiased estimator that is a linear function of
the observationsm(zi ) [21]. It is therefore without loss of generality to focus on this estimator if
one restricts to unbiased linear estimators.6
IPS beyond moment estimation. We defined the Horvitz-Thompson estimator with respect to
moment estimation problems, θ = E[m(z)]. As it turns out, this approach to unbiased estimation
extends even beyond the moment estimation problem to parameter estimation problems defined as
the solution to a system of moment equations E[m(z;θ )] = 0 or parameters defined as the minima
of a moment function argminθ E[m(z;θ )]. We defer this discussion to Section 5.
3 ESTIMATING MOMENTS OF THE DATA DISTRIBUTION
In this section we consider the case where the analyst’s goal is to estimate the mean of a given
moment function of the distribution. That is, there is some function m : C → [0, 1] such that
both 0 and 1 are in the support of random variablem(z), and the goal of the analyst is to estimate
θ = E[m(z)].7 We assume that θˆS , the estimator being applied, is the Horvitz-Thompson estimator
given in Definition 8.
For convenience we will assume that the cost distribution F has finite support, say C =
{c1, . . . , c |C |} with c1 < . . . < c |C | . (We relax the finite support assumption in Section 3.2.) Write
6We note that we have assumed, for convenience, that A(ci ) > 0 for all i ∈ [n] in the expression of this estimator,
for it to be unbiased and well-defined. It is easy to see from the expression for the variance given in Section 3 that the
variance-minimizing allocation rule will indeed be non-zero for each cost.
7Observe that it is easy to deal with the more general case ofm(z) ∈ [a, b] by a simple linear translation, i.e., estimate
m˜(z) = m(z)−ab−a instead, which is in [0, 1] and then translate the estimator back to recoverm(z).
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πt = f (ct ) for the probability of cost ct in F . Also, for a given allocation rule A, we will write
At = A(ct ) for convenience. That is, we can interpret an allocation rule A as a vector of |C| values
A1, . . . ,A |C | . For further convenience, we will write qt = Pr[m(z) = 1|ct ]. This is the probability
that the moment takes on its maximum value when the cost is ct . Finally, we will assume that the
distribution of costs is regular.
Our goal is to address the analyst’s mechanism design problem for this restricted setting. By
Lemma 2.1 it suffices to solve the analyst’s optimization problem. We start by characterizing the
worst-case variance for this setting.
Lemma 3.1. The worst-case variance of the Horvitz-Thompson estimator of a momentm : C → [0, 1],
given cost distribution F and allocation rule A, is:
n · V∗(θˆS ;F ,A) = sup
q∈[0,1]|C|
|C |∑
t=1
πt · qt
At
−
( |C |∑
t=1
πt · qt
)2
(10)
Proof. For any distribution D, observe that the Horvitz-Thompson estimator can be written as
the sum of n i.i.d. random variables each with a variance:
σ 2 = E
[(
m(zi ) · 1{i ∈ S}
A(ci )
)2]
− E
[
m(zi ) · 1{i ∈ S}
A(ci )
]2
=
|C |∑
t=1
πt ·
E
[
m(z)2 |ct
]
At
− E[m(z)]2
Hence, the variance of the estimator is σ 2/n. Observe that conditional on any value c , the worst-case
distribution D, will assign positive mass only to values z ∈ Z such thatm(z) ∈ {0, 1}. This is
because any other conditional distribution can be altered by a mean-preserving spread, pushing all
the mass on these values, while preserving the conditional mean E [m(z)|c]. This would strictly
increase the latter variance. Thus we can assume without loss of generality thatm(z) ∈ {0, 1}, in
which casem(z)2 = m(z) and E[m(z)|c] = Pr[m(z) = 1|c]. Recall that qt = Pr[m(z) = 1|ct ]. Then
we can simplify the variance as:
n · V(θˆS ;D,A) =
|C |∑
t=1
πt · E[m(z)|ct ]
At
− E[m(z)]2 =
|C |∑
t=1
πt · qt
At
−
( |C |∑
t=1
πt · qt
)2
The theorem follows since the worst-case variance is a supremum over all possible consistent
distributions, hence equivalently a supremum over conditional probabilities q : [0, 1] |C | . 
Given the above characterization of the variance of the estimator, we can greatly simplify
the analyst’s optimization problem for this setting. Indeed, it suffices to find the allocation rule
A ∈ (0, 1] |C | that minimizes (10), subject to A being monotone non-decreasing and satisfying the
expected budget constraint.
3.1 Characterization of the Optimal Allocation Rule
We are now ready to solve the analyst’s optimization problem for moment estimation. In this and
all following sections, we denote B¯ = Bn for simplicity of notations, and refer to B¯ as the “average
budget per agent”. Note that different agents with different costs may be allocated different fractions
of the total budget B that in general do not coincide with B¯. We remark that if B¯ is larger than
the expected cost of an agent, then it is feasible (and hence optimal) for the analyst to set the
allocation rule to pick any type with probability 1. We therefore assume without loss of generality
that E[c] > B¯.
Our analysis is based on an equilibrium characterization, where we view the analyst choosing
A and the adversary choosing z as playing a zero-sum game and solve for its equilibria. We first
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present the characterization and some qualitative implications and then present an outline of our
proof. We defer the full details of the proof to the full version of the paper.
Theorem 3.2 (Optimal Allocation for Moment Estimation). The optimal allocation rule A is
determined by two constants A¯ and t∗ ∈ {0, . . . , |C|} such that:
At =
{
A¯ if t ≤ t∗
α√
ct
o.w.
(11)
with α uniquely determined such that the budget constraint is binding.8 Moreover, the parameters A¯
and t∗ can be computed in time O(log(|C|)).
The parameters A¯ and t∗ in Theorem 3.2 are explicitly derived in closed form in the full version
of the paper. For instance, when B¯ ≥ c |C|2 , then t∗ = |C| andAt = A¯ = min
{
1, B¯/E[c]} for all t . When
B¯ ≤
√
c1 E[√c]
2 then t
∗ = 0 and At = B¯√ct E[√c] . In fact, it can be shown (see full version) that in this
latter case, the worst-case distribution is given by q = 1. In particular, in this restricted case, the
approximation of Roth and Schoenebeck [21] is in fact optimal, and indeed our allocation rule
is expressing the solution of Roth and Schoenebeck [21] as a posted menu for a discrete, regular
distribution of costs. In every other case, q , 1 and our solution differs from that of Roth and
Schoenebeck [21], exhibiting a pooling region for low-cost agents. More generally, the computa-
tional part of Theorem 3.2 follows by performing binary search over the support of F , which can
be done in O(log(|C|)) time.
Fig. 1. The pdf (left) of a distribution of costs and the corresponding optimal allocation rule for varying levels
of per-agent budget (right). Note that for sufficiently large budgets, a flat pooling region forms for agents
with low costs.
We note that the optimal rule essentially allocates to each agent inversely proportionally to the
square root of their cost, but may also “pool” the allocation probability for agents at the lower end
of the cost distribution. See Figure 1 for examples of optimal solutions.
The proof of Theorem 3.2 appears in the full version of the paper. The main idea is to view the
optimization problem as a zero-sum game between the analyst who designs the allocation rule A,
and an adversary who designs q so as to maximize the variance of the estimate. We show how to
compute an equilibrium (A∗, z∗) of this zero-sum game via Lagrangian and KKT conditions, and
then note that the obtained A∗ must in fact be an optimal allocation rule for worst-case variance.
8The explicit form of this is α = B¯−A¯ E[c ·1{c≤ct∗ }]
E[√c ·1{c>ct∗ }
.
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The analysis above applied to a discrete cost distribution over a finite support of possible costs.
We show how to extend this analysis to a continuous distribution below, noting that the continuous
variant of the Optimization Problem for Moment Estimation can be derived by taking the limit over
finer and finer discrete approximations of the cost distribution.
3.2 Continuous Costs for Moment Estimation
Definition 9 (Continuous Optimization Problem for Moment Estimation). When costs
are supported on C = [0, 1], the analyst’s optimization problem for the moment estimation problem
based on the Horvitz-Thompson estimator can be written as:
inf
A:(0,1]→[0,1]
sup
x :[0,1]→[0,1]
∫ 1
0
x(c)
A(c) dF (c) −
(∫ 1
0
x(c) dF (c)
)2
s.t.
∫ 1
0
c · A(c) dF (c) ≤ B¯
A is monotone non-increasing
(12)
We can now establish the following continuous variant of Theorem 3.2, which describes the
optimal survey mechanism for continuous cost distributions.
Theorem 3.3 (Continuous Limit of Optimal Allocation). If the distribution of costs is atomless
and supported in (0, 1], then the optimal allocation ruleA is determined by two constants A¯ and x∗ ∈ R
such that:
A(c) =
{
A¯ if c ≤ x∗
α√
c o.w.
(13)
with α uniquely determined such that the budget constraint is binding.9. The quantities A¯ and x∗ are
defined as follows: for any x ∈ R let
Q∞(x) = Ec∼F[min{c,
√
cx}] R∞(x) = 2Ec∼F
[
min
{ c
x
, 1
}]
G(x) = Q∞(x)max(1,R∞(x))
Then x∗ = min{1,G−1(B¯)} and A¯ = 1max(1,R∞(x ∗)) (see Figure 2).10
Proof. See full version. 
Let us give some intuition behind the form of the allocation rule described in Theorem 3.3. As
in Theorem 3.2, the allocation rule will pool agents with low costs (i.e., less than some threshold
x∗), then allocate to higher-cost agents inversely proportional to the square root of their costs.
In the definition of x∗ and A¯, note that Q∞ is non-decreasing and R∞ is non-increasing, so G is
non-decreasing. We therefore have that x∗, the boundary of the pooling region, increases with B¯
up to a maximum value of 1 (at which point all agents are pooled).
Let’s restrict attention to the case where the mean of the distribution is at least as large as half
of the maximum value of the support, i.e. E[c] ≥ 1/2. In this setting, we see that R∞(x) ≤ 1 for all
x ∈ [0, 1], so
G(x) = Q∞(x)
R∞(x) =
x
2 ·
Ec∼F[min{c,√cx}]
Ec∼F [min {c,x}] ≈
x
2 (see Figure 2)
So the optimal allocation sets x∗ ≈ 2B¯. Moreover, the allocation for the pooling region is A¯ =
1
R∞(x ∗) ≈ B¯E[min{c,2B¯ }] . So the optimal mechanism takes the following intuitive form: first, assign
9The explicit form of this is α = B¯−A¯ E[c ·1{c≤x∗}]
E[√c ·1{c>x∗}] .
10We take the convention that if B¯ lies above the range of G , then G−1(B¯) = +∞.
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cB¯
x∗
Fig. 2. Pictorial representation of the function G(x) which defines the optimal threshold x∗, portraying its
close approximation by the function x/2.
each agent an allocation probability A¯ that would, in an alternate world where costs are capped at
2B¯, precisely exhaust the budget. Since costs can actually be greater than 2B¯, this flat allocation
goes over-budget. So, for agents whose costs are greater than 2B¯, we remove allocation probability
so that (a) the budget becomes balanced, and (b) the remaining probability of allocation is inversely
proportional to the square root of the costs.
4 MULTI-DIMENSIONAL PARAMETERS FOR MOMENT ESTIMATION
Section 3 focused on the case of estimating a single-dimensional parameter of the data distribution.
In this section we note that our characterization of the optimal mechanism extends to multi-
dimensional moment estimation as well. In multi-dimensional moment estimation, there is a
functionm : C → [0, 1]d , and our goal is to estimate θ = E[m(z)] ∈ [0, 1]d . Here d is the dimension
of the estimation problem, which we assume to be a fixed constant.
As before, we will estimate θ by applying an estimator θˆ to the data collected from a survey
mechanism. To evaluate an estimator, wemust extend our definition of variance to thed-dimensional
setting, as follows.
Definition 10 (Worst-Case Mean Sqared Error - Risk). Given allocation function A and
distribution D, the expected mean squared error (or risk) of an estimator θˆ is
R(θˆS ;D,A) = EθˆS∼T(D,A)
[θˆS − θ02
2
]
(14)
and the worst-case variance of θˆ is
R∗(θˆS ;F ,A) = sup
D consistent with F
R(θˆS ;D,A). (15)
When θˆ is unbiased, the risk has a natural interpretation: it is simply the sum of variances of
each coordinate of θ , considered separately.
Claim 1 (Risk of Unbiased Estimators). The risk of any unbiased estimator is equal to the sum
of variances of every coordinate:
R(θˆS ;D,A) = EθˆS∼T(D,A)
[
d∑
r=1
(θˆS,r − E[θˆS,r ])2
]
=
d∑
r=1
V(θˆS,r ). (16)
As in the single-dimensional case, the analyst obtains an estimate through the Horvitz-Thompson
estimator, which is defined as follows for parameters in Rd . Also as in the single-dimensional case,
The Horvitz-Thompson estimator is an unbiased estimator of E[m(z)].
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Definition 11 (Horvitz-Thompson Estimator forMulti-dimensionalMoment Estimation).
The Horvitz-Thompson estimator for the case when the parameter of interest is the expected value of a
vector of momentsm : Z → Rd is defined as:
θˆS =
1
n
∑
i ∈[n]
1{i ∈ S}
A(ci ) ·m(zi ) (17)
For our characterization of worst-case risk, we will assume that the moment functionm can take
on the extreme points of the hypercube [0, 1]d .
Assumption 1. D is such that the induced distribution ofm(z) is supported on every extreme point
of the [0, 1]d hypercube.
Lemma 4.1. Under Assumption 1, the worst-case risk of the Horvitz-Thompson estimator of moment
m : C → [0, 1] is
n
d
· R∗(θˆS ;F ,A) = sup
q∈[0,1]|C|
|C |∑
t=1
πt · qt
At
−
( |C |∑
t=1
πt · qt
)2
. (18)
Proof. See full version. 
Lemma 4.1 implies that the optimal survey design problem in the d-dimensional case is, in fact,
identical to the problem considered in the single-dimensional case. We can conclude that Theo-
rems 3.2 and 3.3, which characterized the optimal survey mechanisms for discrete and continuous
single-parameter settings, respectively, also apply to the multi-dimensional setting without change.
5 MULTI-DIMENSIONAL PARAMETER ESTIMATION VIA LINEAR REGRESSION
In this section, we extend beyond moment estimation to a multi-dimensional linear regression
task (we discuss the non-linear case in the full version). For this setting we will impose additional
structure on the data held by each agent. Each agent’s private information consists of a feature
vector xi ∈ R, an outcome value yi ∈ R, and a residual value ϵi ∈ R, that are i.i.d among agents.
Each agent also has a cost ci . The data is generated in the following way: first, xi is drawn from
an unknown distribution X. Then, independently from xi , the pair (ci , ϵi ) is drawn from a joint
distribution D over R2. The marginal distribution over costs, Dc , is known to the designer, but not
the full joint distribution D. Then yi is defined to be
yi = x
⊤
i θ
∗ + ϵi (19)
where θ ∗ ∈ Θ with Θ a compact subset of Rd . We further require that θ ∗ is in the interior of Θ. We
write Dϵ for the marginal distribution over ϵi , which is supported on some bounded range [L,U ],
and has expected value 0. (So, in particular, L ≤ 0 ≤ U .)
When a survey mechanism buys data from agent i , the pair (xi ,yi ) is revealed. Crucially, the
value of ϵi is not revealed to the survey mechanism. The goal of the designer is to estimate the
parameter vector θ ∗.
Note that the single-dimensional moment estimation problem from Section 3 is a special case of
linear regression. Indeed, consider setting d = 1, ϵi = m(zi ) − E[m(zi )] for each i , θ ∗ = E[m(zi )],
and xi to be the constant −1. Then, when the survey mechanism purchases data from agent i , it
learns yi =m(zi ), and estimating θ ∗ is equivalent to estimating the expected value ofm(zi ).
More generally, one can interpret xi as a vector of publicly-verifiable information about agent
i , which might influence a (possibly sensitive) outcome yi . For example, xi might consist of de-
mographic information, and yi might indicate the severity of a medical condition. The coefficient
vector θ ∗ describes the average effect of each feature on the outcome, over the entire population.
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Under this interpretation, ϵi is the residual agent-specific component of the outcome, beyond what
can be accounted for by the agent’s features. We can interpret the independence of xi from (ci , ϵi )
as meaning that each agent’s cost to reveal information is potentially correlated with their (private)
residual data, but is independent of the agent’s features.
As in Section 3, the analyst wants to design a survey mechanism to buy from the agents, obtain
data from the set S of elicited agents, then compute an estimate θˆS of θ . The expected average
payment to each of the n agents should be no more than B¯. As in Section 2.1, we note that the
problem of designing a survey mechanism in fact reduces to that of designing an allocation rule
A that minimizes said variance and satisfies a budget constraint in which the prices are replaced
by known virtual costs. To this end, the analyst designs an allocation rule A and a pricing rule
P so as to minimize the
√
n-normalized worst-case asymptotic mean-squared error of θˆS as the
population size goes to infinity. Our mechanism will essentially be optimizing the coefficient in
front of the leading 1/n term in the mean squared error, ignoring potential finite sample deviations
that decay at a faster rate than 1/n. Note that we will design allocation and pricing rules to be
independent of the population size n; hence, the analyst can use the designed mechanism even if
the exact population size in unknown.
5.1 Estimators for Regression
Let S be the set of data points elicited by a survey mechanism. The analyst’s estimate will then be
the value θˆS that minimizes the Horvitz-Thompson mean-squared error E[(yi − x⊤i θ ∗)2], i.e.,
θˆS = argmin
θ ∈Θ
∑
i
1{i ∈ S}
A(ci ) (yi − x
⊤
i θ )2. (20)
Further, we make the following assumptions on the distribution of data points:
Assumption 2 (Assumption on the distribution of features). E[xix⊤i ] is finite and positive-
definite, and hence invertible.
Finite expectation is a property one may expect real data such has age, height, weight, etc. to
exhibit. The second part of the assumption is satisfied by common classes of distributions, such as
multivariate normals. We first show that θˆS is a consistent estimator of θ .
Lemma 5.1. Under Assumption 2, for any allocation rule A > 0 that does not depend on n, θˆS is a
consistent estimator of θ ∗.
Proof of Lemma 5.1. Let m(θ ;x ,y) = (y − x⊤θ )2, and let wi = 1{i ∈ S} for simplicity. The
following holds:
(1) First, we note that θ ∗ is the unique parameter that minimizes E[(yi − x⊤i θ )2]; indeed, take
any θ , θ ∗, we have that
E[(yi − θ⊤xi )2] = E
[ (
yi − x⊤i θ ∗ + x⊤i (θ ∗ − θ ))2
) ]
= E
[ (
yi − x⊤i θ ∗
)2]
+ E
[ (
x⊤i (θ ∗ − θ )
)2]
+ 2E
[
ϵi (θ ∗ − θ )⊤xi
]
As x and ε are independent, ε has mean 0, this simplifies to
E[(yi − θ⊤xi )2] = E
[ (
yi − θ ∗⊤xi
)2]
+ (θ ∗ − θ )⊤ E [xix⊤i ] (θ ∗ − θ ) + 2(θ ∗ − θ )⊤ E [ϵixi ]
= E
[ (
yi − θ ∗⊤xi
)2]
+ (θ ∗ − θ )⊤ E [xix⊤i ] (θ ∗ − θ )
> E
[ (
yi − θ ∗⊤xi
)2]
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where the last step follows from E[xix⊤i ] being positive-definite by Assumption 2.
(2) By definition, Θ is compact.
(3) m(θ ;x ,y) is continuous in θ , and so is its expectation.
(4) m(.; .) is also bounded (lower-bounded by 0, and upper-bounded by either L2 orU 2), implying
that θ → wiA(ci )m(θ ;xi ,yi ) is continuous and bounded. Hence, by the uniform law of large
number, remembering that wiA(ci )m(θ ;xi ,yi ) are i.i.d,
sup
θ ∈Θ
 1n n∑i=1 wiA(ci )m(θ ;xi ,yi ) − E
[
wi
A(ci )m(θ ;xi ,yi )
] → 0.
Finally, noting that conditional on ci ,m(θ ;xi ,yi ) and wiA(ci ) are independent, we have:
E
[
wi
A(ci )m(θ ;xi ,yi )
]
= E
[
E
[
wi
A(ci )
 ci ] E[m(θ ;xi ,yi ) | ci ]] = E [m(θ ;xi ,yi )]
using E
[
wi
A(ci )
 ci ] = 1.
Therefore, all of the conditions of Theorem 2.1 of [17] are satisfied, which is enough to prove the
result. 
Similarly to the moment estimation problem in Section 3, the goal of the analyst is to minimize
the worst-case (over the distribution of data and the correlation between ci ’s and ϵi ’s) asymptotic
mean-squared error of the estimator θˆS . Here “asymptotic” means the worst-case error as θˆS
approaches the true parameter θ ∗. The following theorem characterizes the asymptotic covariance
matrix of θˆS . (In fact, it fully characterizes the asymptotic distribution of θˆS .)
Lemma 5.2. Under Assumption 2, for any allocation rule A > 0 that does not depend on n, the
asymptotic distribution of θˆS is given by
√
n(θˆS − θ ∗) d−→ N
(
0,E[xix⊤i ]−1 E
[
ϵ2i
1{i ∈ S}
A2(ci )
] )
where d denotes convergence in distribution and where randomness in the expectations is taken on the
costs ci , the set of elicited data points S , the features of the data xi , and the noise ϵi .
Proof of Lemma 5.2. For simplicity, let wi = 1{i ∈ S} and note that the wi ’s are i.i.d. Let
m(θ ;xi ,yi ) = (yi − x⊤i θ )2. First we remark that ∇θm(θ ;xi ,yi ) · wiA(ci ) = 2
wi
A(ci )xi (x⊤i θ − yi ) and
∇2θθm(θ ;xi ,yi ) · wiA(ci ) = 2
wi
A(ci )xix
⊤
i . We then note the following:
(1) θ ∗ is in the interior of Θ.
(2) θ →m(θ ;xi ,yi ) · wiA(ci ) is twice continuously differentiable for all xi ,yi , ci ,wi .
(3)
√
n
(
1
n
∑n
i=1 ∇θ m(θ ∗;xi ,yi ) · wiA(ci )
)
→ N
(
0, 4E
[
wi
A2(ci )xix
⊤
i (x⊤i θ ∗ − yi )2
] )
. This follows di-
rectly from applying the multivariate central limit theorem, noting that
E
[
∇θm(θ ∗;xi ,yi ) · wi
A(ci )
]
= E
[
E[ 2xiϵi | ci ] · E
[
wi
A(ci )
 ci ] ] = E [2xiϵi ] = 0
where the first step follows from conditional indepence on c of x , ϵ with A(c), S , the second
step from E
[
wi
A(ci )
 ci ] = 1, and the last equality follows from the fact that x and ϵ are
independent and E[ϵi ] = 0.
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(4) supθ ∈Θ
E [∇2θθm(θ ;xi ,yi ) · wiA(ci ) ] − 1n ∑i ∇2θθm(θ ;xi ,yi ) · wiA(ci )→ 0, applying the uniform
law of large numbers as ∇2θθm(θ ;xi ,yi ) · wiA(ci ) = 2
wi
A(ci )xix
⊤
i is i) continuous in θ , and ii)
constant in θ , thus bounded coordinate-by-coordinate by 2 wiA(ci )xix
⊤
i that is independent of θ
and has finite expectation 2E[xix⊤i ].
(5) E
[
∇2θθm(θ ;xi ,yi ) · wiA(ci )
]
= 2E[xix⊤i ] is invertible as it is positive-definite.
Therefore the sufficient conditions i)-v) in Theorem 3.1 of [17] hold, proving that the asymptotic
distribution is normal with mean 0 and variance
E[2xix⊤i ]−1 E
[
4 wi
A2(ci ) (x
⊤
i θ − yi )2xix⊤i
]
E[2xix⊤i ]−1.
To conclude the proof, we remark that by independence of xi with ci and εi ,
E
[
wi
A2(ci ) (x
⊤
i θ − yi )2xix⊤i
]
= E[xix⊤i ]E
[
ϵ2i
wi
A2(ci )
]

Lemma 5.2 implies that the worst-case asymptotic mean-squared error, under a budget constraint,
is given by the worst-case trace of the variance matrix. That is,
R∗(F ,A) , sup
X
sup
Dϵ
E
[
ϵ2i
1{i ∈ S}
A2(ci )
]
·
d∑
j=1
E[xix⊤i ]−1j j
s.t. E[ϵi ] = 0
(21)
where recall that Dϵ is the marginal distribution over ϵ and X the distribution over x . Importantly,
this can be rewritten as
R∗(F ,A) ,
(
sup
X
d∑
j=1
E[xix⊤i ]−1j j
)
· sup
Dϵ
E
[
ϵ2i
1{i ∈ S}
A2(ci )
]
s.t. E[ϵi ] = 0
(22)
Therefore, the analyst’s decision solely depend on the worst-case correlation between costs ci and
noise ϵi , and not on the worst-case distribution X. In turn, the analyst’s allocation is completely
independent of and robust in X.
5.2 Characterizing the Optimal Allocation Rule for Regression
As in Section 3, we assume costs are drawn from a discrete set, say C = {c1, . . . , c |C |}. We will then
write At for an allocation rule conditional on the cost being ct , and πt the probability of the cost of
an agent being ct . We will assume that B¯ <
∑ |C |
t=1 πtct , meaning that it is not feasible to accept all
data points, since otherwise it is trivially optimal to set At = 1 for all t .
The following lemma describes the optimization problem faced by an analyst wanting to design
an optimal survey mechanism. Recall that residual values lie in the interval [L,H ].
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Lemma 5.3 (Optimization Problem for Parameter Estimation). The optimization program
for the analyst is given by:
inf
A∈[0,1]|C|
sup
q∈[0,1]|C|
l∑
t=1
πt
At
((1 − qt ) · L2 + qt ·U 2)
s.t.
|C |∑
t=1
πt ((1 − qt ) · L + qt ·U ) = 0
|C |∑
t=1
πtctAt ≤ B¯
A is monotone non-increasing
(23)
Proof of Lemma 5.3. First we note that
R∗(F ,A) ,
(
sup
X
d∑
j=1
E[xix⊤i ]−1j j
)
· sup
Dϵ
E
[
ϵ2i
1{i ∈ S}
A2(ci )
]
s.t. E[ϵi ] = 0
(24)
We can therefore renormalize the worst-case variance by supX
∑d
i=1 E[xix⊤i ]−1ii , as it does not depend
on any other parameter of the problem. The analyst’s objective is now given by
sup
Dϵ
|C |∑
t=1
πt
E[ϵ2i |ct ]
At
s.t.E[ϵi ] = 0
(25)
The worst case distribution is reached when ϵi |ct is binomial between L andU (and such a distribu-
tion is feasible for ϵi |ct ), therefore letting qt = P[ϵi = U | ct ], we obtain the lemma. 
We can now characterize the form of the optimal survey mechanism. For simplicity, we will
assume thatU 2 ≥ L2. This is without loss of generality, since the optimization program is symmetric
in L and U ; if L2 > U 2, the analyst can set qt = 1 − qt , L = U and U = L to obtain Program (23)
withU 2 > L2.
Theorem 5.4. Under the assumptions described above, an optimal allocation rule A has the form
(1) At = min
(
1,α |L |√ct
)
for t < t−
(2) At = A¯ for all t ∈ {t−, . . . , t+}
(3) At = min
(
1,α U√ct
)
for t > t+
for A¯ and α positive constants that do not depend on n, and t− and t+ integers with t− ≤ t+. Further, A¯
and α can be computed efficiently given knowledge of t−, t+.
We remark that the allocation rule that we designed is strictly positive and independent of n (as
the optimization program itself does not depend on n), so Lemmas 5.1 and 5.2 apply. Theorem 5.4
immediately implies that an optimal allocation rule can be obtained by simply searching over the
space of parameters (t−, t+), which can be done in at most |C|2 steps. For each pairs of parameters
(t−, t+), A can be computed efficiently as stated in the Theorem. Then the analyst only needs to
pick the allocation rule that minimizes the objective value among the obtained allocation rules
that are feasible for Program (23). Further, we remark that the solution for the linear regression
case exhibits a structure that is similar to the structure of the optimal allocation rule for moment
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estimation (see Theorem 3.2): it exhibits a pooling region in which all cost types are treated the
same way, and changes in the inverse of the square root of the cost outside said pooling region.
However, we note that we may now choose to pool agents together in an intermediate range of
costs, instead of pooling together agents whose costs are below a given threshold.
Proof sketch. We first compute the best response q∗ of the adversary; we note that this best
response is in fact the solution to a knapsack problem that is independent of the value taken by
the allocation rule A. We can therefore plug the adversary’s best response into the optimization
problem, and reduce the minimax problem above in a simple minimization problem on A. We then
characterize the solution as a function of the parameters (t−, t+) ∈ [|C|]2 through KKT conditions.
The full proof is given in the full version of this paper. 
Non-linear regression: We further show in the full version of the paper that our results extend to
non-linear regression, i.e. when yi is generated by a process of the more general form
yi = f (θ ∗,xi ) + ϵi ,
under a few additional assumptions on the distribution of x and on the regression function f .
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